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Third-Party Innocence: Domestic Authorization of
Foreign Copyright Infringement and Subafilms,
Ltd v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co.
I. Introduction
What, one might ask, is the reason for all of the shaking in
Hollywood recently? It could be another California earthquake. How-
ever, it may also be the trembling of fearful authors, musicians, and
movie producers in the wake of the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in
Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co.1 This is because the
holding in Subafilms arguably puts in jeopardy the security of copy-
righted materials in the global market.
2
The main issue faced in Subafilms is whether an infringement
claim exists under section 106 of the Copyright Act3 "when the as-
serted infringing conduct consists solely of the authorization within
the territorial boundaries of the United States of acts that occur en-
tirely abroad."4 The court faced two central questions in addressing
the issue. The court first had to determine the extent of the authoriza-
tion right granted to copyright owners in section 106 of the Act.5
Next, the court addressed whether the Copyright Act should be ap-
plied extraterritorially. 6 The cases that had previously examined these
problems were somewhat conflicting in their interpretations and appli-
cations.7 Nonetheless, the Subafilms court held that domestic authori-
zations of foreign copyright infringements are not actionable under
1 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3382 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1994) (No. 94-
546).
2 A 1989 survey conducted by the Motion Picture Association of America calculated
that the U.S. motion picture industry suffers losses in excess of $1 billion in revenues every
year from worldwide film, signal, and videocassette piracy. JamesJ. Merriman, Note, Battling
Motion Picture Pirates in Turbid International Waters, 23 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 623, 623 n.2
(1991) (citingJ. Valenti, Statement of the MPAA 5 (1989)). The lost revenue from piracy of
copyrighted works abroad also has serious effects on the book, sound recording, and com-
puter software industries. See, e.g., Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late than Never: Implementation of the
1886 Berne Convention, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 171, 179-80 (1989).
3 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). For the text of the statute, see infra text accompanying note
52.
4 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1089.
5 For a discussion of the court's treatment of authorization, see infra notes 27-39.
6 For a discussion of the court's treatment of extraterritorial application, see infra
notes 40-48.
7 See discussion infra parts ILA, IV.A.
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the Copyright Act, absent further guidance from Congress. 8
Subafilms is important because it attempts to establish a solid rule
in the area of copyright authorizations. 9 The case is also significant
because it reinforces the strict presumption of territoriality in the area
of copyright protection. 10 Regardless of the solidity or the conse-
quences of the decision, it puts copyright owners on clear notice as to
the extent of protection they can expect from the courts in cases of
domestic authorization of foreign infringements.
In Part II, this Note will examine the facts, procedural history, and
decision in the Subafilms case. Parts III and IV of this Note will analyze
the court's reasoning in Subafilms within the context of the law regard-
ing the authorization right and the extraterritorial application' of the
Copyright Act. Part V will conclude that the court's decision, while
correct on the issue of the extraterritorial application of U.S. law, is
questionable with regard to whether an infringement claim can be
brought for domestic authorization.
I. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
In 1966, the British rock band, The Beatles, through Subafilms,
Ltd., entered into ajoint venture with Hearst Corporation to produce
the animated movie 'Yellow Submarine."" Hearst, as agent for the
joint venture (the Producer), negotiated an agreement to distribute
and finance the film with United Artists Corporation (UA). 12 Addi-
tional agreements were made in 1967, and under these terms, UA dis-
tributed the film to movie theaters in 1968 and later to television. 13 In
the early 1980s, UA refused to license "Yellow Submarine" for videocas-
sette because of uncertainty concerning the rights granted in the 1967
agreement.1 4 Nevertheless, in 1987, UA's successor company, MGM/
UA Communications Company (MGM/UA), authorized its subsidiary,
MGM/UA Home Video, Inc., to distribute the picture domestically
and notified Warner Bros., Inc (Warner), in accordance with a prior
licensing agreement, that the film was cleared for international distri-
bution. 15 Despite the Producer's objections, Warner entered into
agreements with third parties for overseas distribution.1 6
8 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1095.
9 See discussion infra part III.B.
10 See discussion infra part IV.B.
11 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1089.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
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B. Round I: District Court and Appeal
In 1988, Subafilms and Hearst (Appellees) brought suit against
MGM/UA, Warner, and their subsidiaries (collectively the Distributors
or Appellants), claiming that the videocassette distribution of the film,
both foreign and domestic, constituted copyright infringement and
breach of the 1967 contracts. 17 The case was first tried before a retired
California Superior Court Judge acting as a special master, who found
for Appellees on both counts.18 The district court adopted all but one
of the special master's factual findings and legal conclusions, awarding
$2,228,000 in compensatory damages to Appellees. 19
A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed this decision, holding that both the domestic and foreign video-
cassette distributions amounted to infringement under the Copyright
Act. 20 The court reasoned that, in accordance with the decision in
Peter Starr Production Co. v. Twin Continental Films, Inc.,21 an infringe-
ment action exists under the Copyright Act where the illegal authoriza-
tion of an entirely foreign infringement takes place in the United
States.22
C. Round II: Rehearing
1. Issue and Holding
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-examined the issue of lia-
bility for the foreign distributions in February 1994 by granting Appel-
lant's petition for rehearing en banc.23 The question was whether the
initial ruling in Subafilms conflicted with a later decision of the court in
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.24 This time, the court
overruled Peter Starr to, the extent that it held extraterritorial acts au-
thorized in the United States actionable.25 The court found in favor of
Appellants, vacated the earlier panel's decision, and remanded the
case.26
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., Nos. 91-56248, 91-56379, 91-
56289, 1993 WL 39269 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 1993). The court did not reach the breach of
contract issue. Id.
21 783 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986). For a full discussion of this case, see infra notes 54-60
and accompanying text.
22 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1090.
23 Id. Liability for the domestic infringement was not contested by Appellants on
rehearing.
24 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582 (1993). For a full discussion
of this case, see infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
25 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1090.
26 Id. Appellees stand to lose a significant portion, possibly half, of their $2,228,000
award since it was based on both domestic and foreign infringement damages.
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2. The Court's Reasoning
The court began its analysis by noting that the Peter Starr court had
conceded that extraterritorial acts themselves, even though authorized
in the United States, could not constitute primary infringements27 of
the Copyright Act.28 Therefore, the Subafilms court determined that
Peter Starr stood for the proposition that one could be liable as an "in-
fringer" merely for authorizing a primary infringement that would
have been illegal if committed in the United States.29 The Subafilms
court took issue with this rule.3 0 The court maintained that the addi-
tion of the words "to authorize" in the 1976 Amendments to the Copy-
right Act was meant to codify the doctrine of "contributory
infringement"3 1 as a form of third-party liability, not to establish a di-
rect cause of action for illegal authorization.3 2 Thus, if no cause of
action existed against the primary infringer, then neither did a cause
exist against the authorizer of the act.33 The court then stated that,
since U.S. copyright laws have no effect outside the United States, an
extraterritorial primary infringement cannot serve as grounds on
which to base the authorizing contributory infringement.3 4
Next, the court addressed several arguments forwarded by Appel-
lees. The first was the contention that this case was materially different
from Lewis Galoob and Columbia Pictures Industries v. Professional Real Es-
tate Investors, Inc.,35 because here the primary acts, although committed
overseas, were in fact infringements specified in section 106.36 The
27 A primary infringement is the direct violation of a right granted to a copyright owner
under § 106 of the Copyright Act. Contributory infringement is the aiding or authorizing of
another to commit a primary infringement. For example, if A rents a properly copyrighted
movie to B for use in an unauthorized public performance, A is the contributory infringer,
and B the primary infringer. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674.
28 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1091.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1092.
31 Contributory copyright infringement developed in accordance with the joint-
tortfeasor principles of vicarious liability. As such, there had to exist a direct infringement of
the owner's exclusive rights by a third party for an action of contributory infringement to lie.
Alfred P. Ewert & Irah H. Donner, Will the New Information Superhighway Create "Super" Problems
for Software Engineers? Contributoiy Infringement of Patented or Copyrighted Software-Related Applica-
tions, 4 ALB. LJ. Sci. & TECH. 155, 186-90 (1994). Because vicarious liability encompassed the
theory of joint and several liability, however, either the direct infringer or the authorizer
could be held liable for the harm. Under this scheme, the owner of a copyright could insti-
tute a direct action against the authorizer without joining the primary infringer in the suit.
See, e.g., Screen Gems-Columbia Music v. Mark-Fi Records, 256 F. Supp. 399, 401 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (allowing a suit against an advertising agency that promoted pirated records and the
record station that broadcast them even though the direct infringer had fled the jurisdiction
and could not be found).
32 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1092.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 1093.
35 For a full discussion of Columbia Pictures and Lewis Galoob, see infra notes 61-64, 77-82
and accompanying text.
36 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1093. Section 106 of the Copyright Act gives the copyright
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court dismissed this distinction on the grounds that there was no
meaningful difference between acts not listed in section 106 and pri-
mary infringements that are not actionable because they occur over-
seas.3 7 The court then distinguished Appellees second argument-
that extraterritorial application of copyright laws is allowed where the
"infringement permits further reproduction abroad"S8 -by maintain-
ing that the cases supporting this principle held infringers liable for
the actual "acts" they committed in the United States, not their author-
ization of acts.3 9
Finally, the court addressed Appellees argument that U.S. copy-
right laws should be applied extraterritorially. 40 Citing judicial adher-
ence to the EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco) presumption of
territoriality, 41 the court found no evidence of congressional intent for
the Copyright Act to be applied extraterritorially. 42 The court refused
to accept Appellees' reliance on Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey43
in support of the argument that the Aramco presumption should be
overcome when failure to apply the law will "result in adverse effects
within the United States."44 The court found that Massey does not de-
mand extraterritorial extension in this situation, 45 that the statutes in-
volved in Massey showed some congressional intent for application
outside the United States, 46 and that Massey approved of the use of the
Aramco presumption where it would avoid "clashes" of law and "inter-
national discord"4 7 as it would in the instant case.4 8
owner the exclusive rights "to do and to authorize" the reproduction, preparation of deriva-
tive works, distribution, performance, and display of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(1)-(5) (1988).
37 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1094 (citing Danjaq, S.A. v. MGM/UA Communications, Co.,
773 F. Supp. 194, 203 (C.D. Cal. 1991), aff'd on other grounds, 979 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1992)).
For a full discussion of Danjaq, see infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
38 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1094 (quoting Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing, Ltd., 843
F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1988)). For a discussion of Update Art, see infra notes 177-79 and accom-
panying text.
39 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1094.
40 Id. at 1095.
41 449 U.S. 244 (1991). For a discussion of the Aramco presumption and exceptions to
its application, see infra notes 152-65 and accompanying text.
42 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1096.
43 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993). For a discussion of Massey, see infra notes 166-72 and
accompanying text.
44 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1096 (quoting Massey, 986 F.2d at 531).
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1097 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991)).
48 Id. The court feared that exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Copyright Act
would cause enmity between the United States and other members of the Berne Convention
to which the United States had recently acceded. Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 102 Stat. 2853, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (1972) (amended
1988) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. See infra note 203 for a discussion of the back-
ground and the effects of the Berne Convention.
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IH. The Scope of the "Authorization" Right
In Subafilms, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit establishes
a bright-line rule against direct actions for domestic authorizations of
foreign copyright infringements. 49 This decision attempts to reconcile
the confusion in the case law regarding the scope of the authorization
right granted copyright owners under the 1976 Amendments to the
Copyright Act.50 In doing so, the court holds that authorization is
solely a third-party form of liability, and that wholly foreign infringe-
ments cannot form the basis upon which a contributory claim is
based.51 An analysis of the statutory and case law suggests, however,
that the court could have allowed an authorization claim under the
facts in Subafilms.
A. Background Law
The applicable statute in Subafilms is section 106 of the Copyright
Act which states that:
[T]he owner of copyright under this tide has the exclusive rights to do
and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works,
to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, includ-
ing the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
5 2
Also of importance is section 501 of the Copyright Act which asserts
that:
(a) Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner as provided by sections 106 through 118... is an infringer of the
copyright.
(b) The legal or beneficial owner of an 'exclusive right under a copy-
right is entitled .. .to institute an action for any infringement of any
particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.
53
49 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1090. Commentators are not uniform in their views on this
issue. Compare 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04
[A] [3] [b], at 12-86 (1994) ("[A] primary activity outside the boundaries of the United States
... cannot serve as the basis for holding liable under the Copyright Act one who is merely
related to that activity within the United States.") with 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, CoPYRIGHT: PRNcI-
PLES, LAw AND PRACrIcE § 6.1, at 706 n.4 (1989) (concluding that "Peter Starr's interpretation
of section 106's authorization right would appear to be at least literally correct since the
statute nowhere requires that the direct infringement occur within the United States").
50 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1093-95. See discussion infra part III.B.
51 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1090.
52 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) (emphasis added).
53 Id. § 501 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
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Since the passage of the 1976 Amendment to the Copyright Act,
courts have endeavored to decide whether or not the words "to author-
ize" in section 106 of the Act grant the copyright owner a direct cause
of action against illegal authorizers. An early case that directly ad-
dressed the issue was Peter Starr Production Co. v. Twin Continental Films,
Inc.5 4 In Peter Starr, defendants entered into a licensing agreement in
the United States with a third party for the foreign distribution of
plaintiff's movie without plaintiff's authority.55 Subsequently, over
four hundred copies of plaintiff's film were distributed on videocas-
sette in Sweden and the United Kingdom.5 6 The Ninth Circuit held
that plaintiffs had properly alleged a copyright infringement under the
Copyright Act.57 Reading sections 106 and 501 together, the court de-
termined that the "plain language" of the Act established a direct
cause of action against illegal authorizations that occur within the
United States.58 According to its interpretation of both the statute and
the Supreme Court's holding in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc.,59 the court held that defendants were directly liable for
their illegal authorization of a right protected under section 106.60
The Ninth Circuit continued its effort to define the limits of the
Copyright Act as applied to illegal authorizations in Columbia Pictures
Industries v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc.61 There the court de-
termined that the providing of videodisc players to hotel guests did not
constitute an illegal authorization. 62 Because hotel viewers were not
using the movies for "public" performances, their actions did not fall
54 783 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986).
55 Id. at 1441-42.
56 Id. at 1442.
57 Id. at 1443.
58 Id. at 1442-43.
59 Id. at 1443 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
435 n.17 (1984)). In Sony, copyright owners of various television programs brought suit
against Sony for allegedly authorizing and assisting in the infringement of their protected
shows. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 420. The owners claimed that Sony's manufacture of home
video tape recorders (VTRs) allowed individuals to record and to exhibit commercially their
works in violation of the Copyright Act. Id. The Court found that the consumers' use of the
VTRs for "time-shifting" convenience constituted a "fair use" over which the copyright own-
ers had no control. Id. at 454-55. Thus, the Court concluded, the sale of VTRs by Sony did
not constitute contributory infringement. Id. at 456.
In Sony, the Supreme Court stated that: "[A] n infringer is not merely one who uses a
work without authorization by the copyright owner, but also one who authorizes the use of a
copyrighted work without actual authority from the copyright owner." Id. at 417, 435 n.17
(alteration in original). The Peter Starr court relied on the Supreme Court's definition of an
"infringer" to find defendants guilty for unauthorized licensure of an act prohibited under
§ 106 of the Copyright Act. Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Continental Films, Inc., 783 F.2d
1440, 1442-43 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, the finding by the Peter Starr court is distinquished from
that in Sony where the actions of the primary infringers were found to be "fair uses" and not
prohibited under § 106. Sony, 464 U.S. 454-55.
60 Peter Starr, 783 F.2d at 1442-43.
61 866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989).
62 IM at 279-81.
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under the restrictions of section 106.63 The court reasoned that an
authorizing party (i.e., the hotel) could not be held liable when the
actions of the authorized party (i.e., the hotel guest) did not constitute
a violation under the Act.64
The Court for the Central District of California faced the authori-
zation issue two years later in Danjaq, S.A. v. MGM/UA Communications
Co.65 In this case, U.S.-based defendants sought agreements with nu-
merous European television stations to distribute plaintiff's movies
without plaintiff's consent.66 Because the movies had not been distrib-
uted or publicly aired at the time of the suit, and under the terms of
the agreement could not be illegal, the court held that defendants
were not liable for illegal authorization. 67 The court reasoned that,
although sections 106 and 501 grant a direct cause of action for au-
thorization, there must first be a primary infringement of the Act upon
which to base the liability of the authorizer. 68
The Danjaq court went on to state that, because U.S. copyright
laws do not apply overseas, the authorizations could not have been ille-
gal because the primary infringements would not fall under the juris-
diction of section 106 of the Copyright Act.69 However, this portion of
the opinion seems at odds with the court's reasoning earlier in its deci-
sion. In defining the word "authorize," the court had stated, "there
may be many reasons why a party may not be held accountable for its
conduct in court. What is important is that contributory infringement
be hinged upon an act of primary infringement, even if the primary
infringer for some reason escapes judicial scrutiny."70 This statement
seems to suggest that the authorizer of an extraterritorial violation
would be liable as long as there was evidence of an actual primary in-
fringement of a section 106 right.
The District Court for the Eastern District of California attempted
to reconcile this apparent contradiction in the case law in ITSI T.V.
Productions v. California Authority of Racing Fairs.7 1 In ITSI T. V, Califor-
nia-based defendants allegedly authorized simultaneous broadcasts of
closed-circuit television signals to Mexico without plaintiff's permis-
63 Id. at 281.
64 Id. at 282.
65 773 F. Supp. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1991), aff'd on othergrounds, 979 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1992).
66 Id. at 200.
67 Id. at 202. The terms of the authorization agreement were contingent on the defend-
ant's acquisition of the copyright. Therefore, an illegal authorization was impossible, since
the defendant would become the owner of the § 106 rights prior to the authorization. Id. at
200-02.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 202-03. The portion of the opinion regarding extraterritorial infringements is
arguably dicta since the court had already determined that an infringing use could never
materialize. Id. at 202.
70 Id. at 201.
71 785 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
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sion.72 Looking to sections 106 and 501, the court concluded that the
Copyright Act establishes a direct cause of action for illegal authoriza-
tions in the United States.73 The court maintained that this action is a
contributory liability action, however, and must follow a primary in-
fringement. 74 The court explained that the location of the "author-
ized" act is irrelevant, though, as long as it is the type of act that is
illegal under section 106.75 Thus, the court combined the notions of
the authorization right expressed in Peter Starr with those of Columbia
Pictures. The court accords its interpretation with Danjaq by noting
that the case was decided on the contract issue and that the Danjaq
court should have limited its opinion to that finding.76
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the authorization
question most recently in Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America,
Inc.77 Defendant's product, the Game Genie, enabled users to alter
the performance of plaintiff's home video games. 78 Plaintiffs claimed
that defendant's marketing and sale of the item "authorized" the crea-
tion of derivative works by consumers. 79 The court disagreed on the
grounds that the users were not creating derivative works as under-
stood to fall under section 106 protection.80 Relying on the decision
in Sony,81 the same authority cited in Peter Star, the court concluded
that there cannot be liability for authorizing an action that is not un-
lawful under the Copyright Act.8 2
B. Significance of Subafilms
In following the holding in Lewis Galoob, the Subafilms court sig-
nals a retreat from the more expansive readings of the authorization
right as defined by Peter Starr, Danjaq, and ITSI TV. The crux of the
Subafilms court's decision is that the phrase "to authorize" in section
106 grants copyright owners only a third-party cause of action and not
72 Id. at 856-57. Interestingly, because no evidence of intent or knowledge was offered,
the plaintiff in TSI T. V. failed to produce sufficient evidence of an illegal authorization in
the United States. Id. at 864-66. And, because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction,
the court would not allow evidence to be introduced to show an illegal primary infringement
in Mexico to overrule defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 864-65.
73 Id. at 859-60.
74 Id. at 861 (citing Cable/Home Communications v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d
829, 845 (lth Cir. 1990)).
75 Id. at 863.
76 Id.
77 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582 (1993).
78 Id. at 967.
79 Id. at 970.
80 Id.
81 See supra note 59.
82 See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 970-71 (9th Cir.
1992) ("recogniz[ing] that a party who distributes a copyrighted work cannot dictate how
that work is to be enjoyed"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582 (1993).
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a direct cause of action against illegal authorizers. 83 Therefore, if the
primary infringer cannot be held liable under the Copyright Act,
neither can the authorizer. 84 An analysis of applicable statutory and
case law suggests, however, that in reaching this conclusion, the court
underemphasized the effect of section 501 of the Act and overempha-
sized the liability of the primary infringer as opposed to the type of
infringing activity involved.
First, the Subafilms court arguably did not recognize the impor-
tance of section 501 of the Copyright Act to the reserved rights enu-
merated in section 106. Section 501 is critical in determining the
scope of the authorization right granted to copyright owners.85 Sec-
tion 106 merely grants the authorization right, while section 501 clari-
fies who may institute an action for enforcement of that right.86
Section 501 (a) defines an "infringer" as "[a] nyone who violates any of
the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106
through 118."87 The Act goes on to state in section 501 (b) that a copy-
right owner may "institute an action for any infringement of any partic-
ular right."88 These rights include the exclusive privilege of copyright
owners "to authorize" the duplication and distribution of copyrighted
material.89 Reading the "plain language" of the Act, as did the Peter
Star court, sections 501 and 106 together appear to state a direct cause
of action merely for the illegal authorization of infringing uses of copy-
righted works.90
The legislative history of the Act supports this view. Congress
stated that the "[u]se of the phrase 'to authorize' is intended to avoid
any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers."91 The
Supreme Court lent its support to this view.92 In Sony, the Court stated
that "an infringer is not merely one who uses a work without authoriza-
tion by the copyright owner, but also one who authorizes the use of a
copyrighted work without actual authority from the copyright
owner. '93 Thus, although the authorization claim must by definition
83 Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3382 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1994) (No. 94-546).
84 Id.
85 See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993); Video Views,
Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1017 (7th Cir. 1991); SAS Inst. v. S & H Computer Sys.,
605 F. Supp. 816, 829 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
86 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
87 Id. § 501(a).
88 Id. § 501(b).
89 Id. § 106(1)-(5) (1988).
90 Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Continental Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440, 1442-43 (9th
Cir. 1986).
91 H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5674.
92 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 n.17 (1984). For
a discussion of the facts in Sony, see supra note 59.
93 Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 n.17. In Sony, the authorization suit proceeded even though
neither the identity of all the direct infringers nor the exact infringements were known. Id.
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be based on a primary infringement, the claim is a direct action against
the authorizer in his capacity as an "infringer" irrespective of the liabil-
ity of the primary infringer.94
The Subafilms court did not substantially address the impact of sec-
tion 501 on the authorization right.95 The court's reading of the
phrase "to authorize" came almost exclusively from its earlier holding
in Lewis Galoob.96 However, the Lewis Galoob court failed to mention
the section 501 provision in its opinion.97 Thus, the court's analysis of
the relevant statutory law arguably fails to recognize the weight the Act
gives to focusing on the authorizer as an independent infringer. 98
Second, the Subafilms court overemphasized its ability to subject
primary infringers to liability under the Copyright Act without looking
at the type of infringement involved. In its analysis, the court focuses
on what it views as two irreconcilable trends in the case law.99 Accord-
ing to the court, the first supports a third-party cause of action and the
other a direct cause of action for authorization. 100 The court resolves
the perceived conflict by looking to the history of contributory copy-
right infringement doctrine under the 1909 Act, thereby strictly adopt-
ing authorization as a third-party cause of action.' 01 This holding,
however, fails to recognize the important integration of illegal authori-
zation in the case law since the passage of the 1976 Amendment. 10 2
One strand of the case law appears to support the application of
authorization as a third-party cause of action. In Lewis Galoob, the
court held that no infringing authorization had been committed by
defendant because the court found no "unfair use" by consumers of
defendants' product.103 Similarly, the Columbia Pictures court held that
viewing movies in a hotel room was not a "public" performance under
section 106; therefore, the providing of videodisc players for viewing
at 423-24; Ewert & Donner, supra note 31, at 184. The Court accepted surveys of consumer
uses as evidence in deciding whether a primary infringement had occurred. Sony, 464 U.S. at
423-24.
94 Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 n.17 .
95 Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1090-92 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3382 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1994) (No. 94-546).
96 Id. at 1092. The court also cited for authority Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Profes-
sional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278, 279-81 (9th Cir. 1989) and 3 DAVID NIMMER &
MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A] [3] [a], at 12-80 n.82 (1991).
97 Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582 (1993).
98 This failure may account for the court's emphasis on the location of the primary
infringements.
99 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1091-92.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1092-93.
102 For a discussion of the cases supporting this contention, see infra notes 103-10 and
accompanying text.
103 Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 970-71 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582 (1993).
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the movies was not an illegal authorization. 10 4 Finally, in Danjaq there
was deemed to be no illegal authorization because the anticipated in-
fringing use had not yet taken place, and therefore there was no pri-
mary infringement. 10 5 Under this theory, a primary infringement
under section 106 must be actionable before an illegal authorization
action based on that infringement can be sustained. 10 6
The other strand of cases appears to interpret illegal authorization
as a direct infringement of the Copyright Act.10 7 In Peter Star, the de-
fendant authorized the illegal reproduction of videocassettes over-
seas, 10 8 and in ITSI T.V, the defendants were alleged to have
improperly authorized the rebroadcast of closed-circuit television sig-
nals to infringers in Mexico. 10 9 The courts in both cases concluded
that the specific country in which the "authorized" act took place was
irrelevant; therefore, the authorization alone was actionable as a direct
infringement.' 10
The reason for this divergence of opinions seems readily explaina-
ble. It would be unjust for courts to hold a person liable for authoriz-
ing an act that would not be illegal had the person directly committed
that act.' By the same reasoning, it seems equally unjust that one can
violate a copyright by authorizing its illegal use, but escape liability just
because the "partner in crime" is overseas. 12 The attempt by courts to
reconcile these differing fact situations accounts for the perceived di-
chotomy in the case law.
Nevertheless, a pattern emerges when all the cases are examined
together. Courts have allowed direct actions against illegal authorizers
as long as a section 106 primary infringement has occurred, irrespec-
tive of whether or not the primary infringer could be held liable indi-
vidually." 3 A full reading of precedent, therefore, reveals that the
phrase "to authorize" both encompasses the doctrine of contributory
infringement as a third-party theory of liability and establishes a direct
cause of action against illegal authorizers. This helps explain the
seemingly contrary decisions in the factually similar cases of Danjaq
104 Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278,
279-81 (9th Cir. 1989).
105 Danjaq, S.A. v. MGM/UA Communications Co., 773 F. Supp. 194, 200-02 (C.D. Cal.
1991), aff'd on other grounds, 979 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1992).
106 Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3382 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1994) (No. 94-546); Lewis Galoob, 964 F.2d at 97 0.
107 See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
108 Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Continental Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440, 1441-42 (9th
Cir. 1986).
109 ITSI T.V. Prods. v. California Auth. of Racing Fairs, 785 F. Supp. 854, 856-57 (E.D.
Cal. 1992).
110 Peter Starr, 783 F.2d at 1442-43; TSI TV., 785 F. Supp. at 863.
111 See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A] [3] [b],
at 12-86 to 12-92 (1994).
112 See ITS1 T.V., 785 F. Supp. at 862-63.
113 See discussion supra part III.A.
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and Peter Starr. In both cases, subject matter jurisdiction could not be
exercised over the alleged primary infringers, but in Peter Starr the ac-
tions of the primary infringer fell within the scope of the section 106
rights whereas in Danjaq they did not because they had not yet oc-
curred. 114 The central issue was whether the primary infringements
were of the type protected as section 106 rights, not whether the Copy-
right Act applied to the location of the primary infringements.11 5
When the effect of section 501 and the applicable case law are
examined, it appears that the Subafilms court may have incorrectly ap-
plied the law of illegal authorization under the Copyright Act. Under
the plain reading of the statute, the Act grants to copyright owners a
direct cause of action against illegal authorizers.1 16 That cause is de-
pendent on a finding that a primary infringement as defined in section
106 in fact occurred." 7 The suit is not dependent, however, on the
ability to hold the primary infringer liable.118 Accordingly, a con-
firmed foreign infringement falling under the rubric of section 106
should be able to form the basis of a domestic authorization action.' 1 9
In Subafilms, Appellants, without the owners' consent, authorized the
illegal duplication and distribution of plaintiff's properly copyrighted
work.' 20 The actual infringements plainly fell within the enumerated
rights of section 106 and the only thing preventing prosecution was
their location overseas. 12 1 Thus, the Subafilms court could have found
the domestic authorization of foreign copyright infringements illegal
under the Copyright Act.
IV. Extraterritorial Application of the Copyright Act
The second issue in Subafilms was the applicability of the Copy-
right Act outside the borders of the United States. Appellees argued in
Subafilms that the Copyright Act should apply extraterritorially "when
the type of infringement permits further reproduction abroad,"' 22 and
where the infringement "will result in adverse effects inside the United
States."' 23 The court did not agree. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit
adopted a strict presumption against extraterritorial application of
U.S. copyright law. 124 Although this presumption is contrary to the
114 See supra notes 54-60, 65-70 and accompanying text.
115 See supra notes 54-60, 65-70 and accompanying text.
116 See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
117 See supra note 91-94 and accompanying text.
118 See supra note 91-94 and accompanying text.
119 See Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Continental Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440, 1442-43 (9th
Cir. 1986).
120 Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3382 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1994) (No. 94-546).
121 Id. at 1089-90.
122 Id at 1090, 1094 (quoting Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67,
73 (2d Cir. 1988)).
123 Id. at 1095.
124 Id.
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general trend, 25 the court's decision is probably justified in light of
the circumstances in this case.126 This section first will examine rele-
vant cases in the development of the extraterritorial application doc-
trine. It will then analyze the Subafilms decision within this context.
A. Background Law
The extension of U.S. laws beyond the borders of the United
States is an issue with which the Supreme Court has struggled for
nearly a century.1 27 During that time, the Court has given varying
weight to two factors in deciding whether to extend a statute extraterri-
torially: first, whether Congress intended a statute to apply extraterri-
torially, and second, whether extraterritorial application of a statute
would cause international conflict.1 28
Two early cases illustrate the Court's struggle to define the extra-
territorial application of U.S. laws. In American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 129 the Court refused to extend the Sherman Antitrust Act to a
domestic corporation that induced Costa Rican officials to seize plain-
tiff's assets.130 Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, indicated that the
direct injection of U.S. law into another sovereign's governmental ac-
tions was beyond the authority of the Court.13' Holmes went on to
state that a statute should be read as "intended to be confined in its
operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker
has general and legitimate power."132 In New York Central Railroad Co.
v. Chisholm,133 the Court took a more strict approach, looking solely to
the construction of the statute to determine whether extension outside
the United States was permissible.134 The Court held that the federal
Employer's Liability Act contained no language indicating an intent to
apply it extraterritorially, and refused to grant recovery for the death
of a U.S. citizen employed by a train company who was killed thirty
miles inside Canada.13 5
A significant case in the Court's effort to define a standard for
extraterritorial application is Foley Bros. v. Filardo.13 6 In that case, Foley
125 See discussion infra part IV.A.
126 See discussion infra part IV.B.
127 See, e.g., Suzanne B. Krolikowski, Note, A Sovereign in a SovereignIess Land? The Extrater-
ritorial Application of United States Lav. EDF v. Massey, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 333,
335-43 (1994).
128 See infra notes 129-72.
129 213 U.S. 347 (1908).
130 Id. at 354-55 (interpreting Sherman Anti-trust Act ofJuly 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209
(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
131 Id. at 356.
132 Id. at 357.
133 268 U.S. 29 (1925).
134 Id. at 31.
135 Id. at 30-32 (interpreting Employers' Liability Act of Apr. 22, 1908, ch. 149, 35 Stat.
65 (amended 1910)).
136 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
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Brothers, under contract with the U.S. government to build public
works in Iraq, refused to pay their employee Filardo for overtime
work.13 7 Filardo sought relief under the Federal Eight Hour Law.1 38
The Court, in holding against extraterritorial application, stated that
no congressional intent could be found to extend the law outside the
United States.1 39 In its analysis, however, the Court took a more ex-
panded approach to determining intent than in previous cases, analyz-
ing not only the language of the law, but also the legislative history and
administrative interpretations.1 40
The Supreme Court moved toward a combination and expansion
of the intent and international comity tests in two cases interpreting
the foreign application of the National Labor Relations Act of 1947
(NLRA). 141 In Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo,142 the Court refused
to extend the NLRA to a controversy between the foreign crews of two
foreign flag ships harbored in an American port. 143 Similarly, in Mc-
Culloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,144 the Court de-
nied extension of the NLRA to Honduran crewmen on board a ship
owned by a foreign subsidiary of an American corporation flying a for-
eign flag.1 45 In both cases, the Court expanded its analysis of statutory
intent to include relevant evidence beyond the plain language of the
statute.' 46 Both cases also included the Court's consideration of
broader international questions, including the United States interest
in and connections with the dispute as well as the potential for interna-
tional discord. 14 7
The Court applied this combination approach to find grounds for
extending U.S. law in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.148 In this case, the
Court held that Bulova Watch Company could sue a U.S. citizen who
had registered the Bulova name in Mexico and placed "Bulova" on
Mexican watches in violation of U.S. trademark and unfair competi-
137 Id. at 282-83.
138 Id. at 283 (citing 40 U.S.C. §§ 321-326 (1940) (repealed 1962)).
139 Id. at 285. The Subafilms court did not address the international comity question in
Foley Bros.
140 Id. at 285-88.
141 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1947).
142 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
143 Id. at 139. The Court first examined both the language and the legislative history of
the statute and found no congressional intent to extend the Act. Id. at 142-44. The Court,
however, went on to examine the U.S. interests in and connections to the dispute, as well as
the potential for international conflict. Id. at 142. Since no American sailors were involved,
and since the only connection was the location of the ships in an American port, the Court
decided against extension. See id. at 145-47.
144 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
145 Id. at 12-14. Besides finding no congressional intent to extend the act, the Court
emphasized the minor U.S. connections involved, and the potential for conflict with existing
treaties and Honduran law. Id. at 14-20.
146 See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text; see also Krolikowski, supra note 127, at
337-39.
148 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
19951
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
tion laws. 149 The Court read the statutes broadly and determined that
defendant's actions were covered.150 Furthermore, the Court went on
to state that Congress has the power to regulate the actions of U.S.
citizens in foreign countries as long as the rights of the foreign country
are not impinged. 151
The Court retreated from this trend and advocated a strict con-
structionist interpretation of U.S. statutes' extraterritorial application
in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco).152 This suit involved the
alleged Title VII discrimination of an American citizen employed by an
American company doing business overseas.' 53 The majority stated
that Congress makes laws under the presumption of territoriality.15 4
The presumption, according to the majority, "serves to protect against
unintended clashes between [U.S.] laws and those of other nations
which could result in international discord."' 55 Thus, the Court reaf-
firmed the general proposition that congressional legislation only ap-
plies within the borders of the United States unless specifically
intended to apply abroad.' 56 The Court went on, however, to advocate
a much stricter reading of congressional intent, reminiscent of N. Y
Central157 The Court stated that, legislation will apply only within the
United States "unless there is 'the affirmative intention of the Congress
clearly expressed' " to the contrary.158 Finding no such intention, the
majority found Title VII inapplicable. 159
Justice Marshall disputed the majority's holding that the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality is a "canon" of statutory construction. 60
Justice Marshall contended that the presumption should apply only af-
ter "all available indicia of Congress' intent" have been explored.16'
Moreover, Justice Marshall suggested that two different levels of analy-
sis should apply, depending upon the citizenship of the person af-
149 Id. at 281-82. The suit involved the application of the Lanham Trademark Act of
1946. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072, 1091-1096, 1111-1127 (1946).
150 Steele, 344 U.S. at 285-86.
151 Id.
152 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
153 Id. at 246-47. Title VII protects employees from discrimination because of their race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1988).
154 Id. at 248.
155 Id.
156 Id. See, e.g., Ryuichi Yamakawa, Territoriality and Extraterritoriality: Coverage of Fair Em-
ployment Laws After EEOC v. ARAMCO, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 71 (1992).
157 See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
158 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)(quoting
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)).
159 Id. at 249. Congress amended Title VII to apply extraterritorially shortly after the
Aramco decision. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). For
additional information on Title VII, see Timothy A. Wilkins, Note, Recent Developments,
Title VII Protection for US. Citizens Working Overseas - EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.
(Aramco), 33 HARv. INT'L LJ. 313 (1992).
160 Aramco, 499 U.S. at 261 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 266 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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fected by the law.162 In situations involving foreign nationals or raising
questions of international comity, Justice Marshall supported the
bright-line interpretation followed by the majority. 163 Where the law
merely regulates the conduct of U.S. citizens abroad, however, Justice
Marshall supported a less strict presumption of territoriality.164 He
stated: "Because two different rules of construction apply depending
on the national identity of the regulated parties, the same statute might
be construed to apply extraterritorially to United States nationals but
not to foreign nationals." 165
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia qualified the
Aramco majority's strict presumption of territoriality in Environmental
Defense Fund v. Massey.166 At issue in Massey was whether the National
Environmental Policy Act applied to actions in Antarctica. 167 In hold-
ing that the Act did apply, the court announced three exceptions to
the Aramco strict presumption of territoriality.1 6  The first exception
arose when the " 'affirmative intention of the Congress clearly ex-
pressed' [was] to extend the scope of the statute to conduct occurring
within other sovereign nations."1 69 The second exception applied
when "adverse effects within the United States" would occur from the
failure to extend the law. 170 The last exception to the Aramco pre-
sumption was where the conduct regulated occurred primarily in the
United States, even if the effects were largely felt extraterritorially.1 71
Only the last exception applied directly to the court's finding in
Massey. 172
Two related cases on extraterritorial application figured promi-
162 Id. at 274 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated that the strict "clear-state-
ment rule" against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law was only proper in cases like
Benz and McCulloch where extension would cause problems of enforcement authority be-
tween the United States and foreign nations. Id. at 265 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982);
Longshoremen v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195 (1970)). "The strictness of the McCul-
loch and Benz presumption permits the Court to avoid, if possible, the separation-of-powers
and international-comity questions associated with construing a statute to displace the do-
mestic law of another state." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall concluded that
such problems are not involved in situations where Congress only seeks to govern the actions
of U.S. citizens in foreign countries. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Steele v. Bulova
Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-86 (1952); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73-74 (1941)).
Thus, Foley's less strict "presumption against territoriality" should be applied to situations
involving U.S. nationals abroad. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 274 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
164 Id. at 274-75 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 274 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
166 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993). For a discussion of this qualification, see Krolikowski,
supra note 127.
167 Massey, 986 F.2d at 529.
168 Id. at 531.
169 Id. (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991)).
170 Id.
171 Id. at 531-32.
172 Id. at 532-33.
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nently in the Subafilms court's analysis because they dealt directly with
the foreign application of the Copyright Act. In Robert Stigwood Group,
Ltd. v. O'Reilly,i t s the Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined that
Canadian performances of the copyrighted play "Jesus Christ Super-
star" were not infringements under U.S. copyright law.174 The court
maintained that only those domestic violations that allow for further
reproduction of copyrighted materials abroad are covered by the
Copyright Act. 175 Because there was no initial act in the United States,
and because plays cannot be reproduced abroad like written material,
the court found no grounds for extending the Act to Canada.176 The
Second Circuit elaborated on this holding in Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin
Publishing, Ltd.177 In that case, the court allowed plaintiffs to recover
under the Copyright Act for the unauthorized reproduction in Israel
of defendant's copyrighted poster.178 The court reasoned that since
the initial reproduction took place in the United States, the Copyright
Act would extend extraterritorially to determine damages based on
sales in Israel. 179
B. The Subafilms Court's Approach
Vital to the Subafilms court's holding is its assertion that U.S. copy-
right laws do not operate extraterritorially. This conclusion serves as a
ground for the court's denial of Appellees third-party authorization
action as well as its rejection of Appellees' contention that the court
should extend the authority of the Act as a whole.180 An examination
of precedent in this area suggests that the court's decision against ex-
traterritorial application of the Copyright Act was appropriate despite
difficulties in its analysis.
The first part of the court's inquiry addressed Appellees' reliance
on the Second Circuit's decisions in Robert Stigwood and Update Art.181
These opinions supported extraterritorial application of U.S. copyright
laws where "the type of infringement permits further reproduction
abroad." 182 The court properly distinguished these cases as involving
173 530 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1976).
174 Id. at 1100-01.
175 Id. at 1101.
176 See id. (explaining that the compulsory royalty provision under the statute was inap-
plicable because the initial preparations did not constitute infringing actions themselves).
177 843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1988).
178 Id.
179 See id. (explaining that if the facts did in fact show that the alleged copying occurred
in the United States, the magistrate was correct to include damages accruing from the Israeli
newspaper).
180 Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1093-99 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3382 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1994) (No. 94-546).
181 Id. at 1094.
182 Id. (quoting Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d. Cir.
1988)).
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direct actions for domestic infringements.1 8 3 Plaintiffs in both cases
sought liability on the basis of defendants' actual infringements in the
United States, not for the authorization of a foreign activity.' 8 4 Under
this reasoning, had the Subafilms court found a sufficient infringing
activity in the United States, the Copyright Act would have been ex-
tended extraterritorially to cover the effects of the foreign infringe-
ment.18 5 In the absence of such a showing, the court was correct in
abiding by the tradition against extraterritorial application of the
Copyright Act.186
The second part of the court's extraterritorial analysis dealt with
the judicial authority to extend acts of Congress to actions beyond the
borders of the United States. 1 87 In holding that the Copyright Act ap-
plies only to actions in the United States, the court relied heavily upon
the Aramco presumption.188 In doing so, the court applied a bright-
line rule of territoriality.' 89 Under this interpretation, the presump-
tion can be overcome only by the clear intent of Congress affirmatively
expressed. 190 This automatic deference to the presumption may have
been premature. As Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent in
Aramco, the presumption was designed as a final rule of construction to
be applied only after all sources of congressional intent were
exhausted.1 91
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently bol-
stered Justice Marshall's argument. In Kollias v. D&G Marine Mainte-
nance,'9 2 the court held that the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act (LHWCA) did apply to injuries sustained by work-
ers on the high seas.' 9 3 The court maintained that, although the
LHWCA was subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality, suf-
ficient intent of Congress to apply the Act extraterritorially existed for
extension and enforcement on the high seas. 19 4 The court rejected
183 Id.
184 See id. at 1094-95.
185 See id.
186 See Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d. Cir. 1988) ("It is
well established that copyright laws generally do not have extraterritorial application."); Rob-
ert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d. Cir. 1976) ("Copyright laws do
not have extraterritorial operation."); ITSI T.V. Prod. v. California Auth. of Racing Fairs, 785
F. Supp. 854, 862 (E.D. Cal. 1992) ("As a general matter... United States copyright laws do
not have extraterritorial effect. . . ."); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYIGHT § 12.04[A] [3] [b], at 12-86 (1994) (stating that it is an "undisputed axiom that
United States copyright law has no extraterritorial application").
187 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1095-99.
188 Id. For a discussion of the Aramco presumption, see supra notes 152-59 and accompa-
nying text.
189 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1095-96.
190 Id. at 1095.
191 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 261 (1991) (Marshall,J.,
dissenting).
192 29 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1994).
193 Id. at 75.
194 Id. at 73-75.
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the presumption as a strict rule by pointing out the possible logical
inconsistencies under such an application: "If the presumption against
extraterritoriality were a clear statement rule, reference to legislative
history and other extrinsic indicia of congressional intent, including
administrative interpretations, would be prohibited. In Aramco itself,
however, the Court considered the EEOC's interpretation of Title
VII." 19 5
This reading by the Subafilms court also neglects the differential
application standard advocated by Justice Marshall and the cases pre-
ceding Aramco.196 It is arguable that a more flexible standard for ex-
tending the Copyright Act could have been utilized in Subafilms
because the primary infringer, Warner, was a domestic company.197
Nevertheless, the court's strict presumption application is defensi-
ble despite its failure to directly address the nationality issue. The pur-
pose of the dual application standard is to respect foreign countries'
sovereignty and thereby avoid international discord. 198 This concern
formed the basis of the Subafilms court's deference to the presump-
tion. 199 Justice Marshall maintained that the strict presumption of ter-
ritoriality was appropriate under the differential application standard
where the action of U.S. nationals abroad raises issues of international
comity.200 Thus, the court achieved the same goal as the differential
application would have accomplished, despite the court's neglect of
the nationality issue.
Furthermore, the court's position is strengthened by its treatment
of the Massey decision. Under Massey, the presumption of territoriality
is supported in situations where extraterritorial application of U.S. law
could cause international conflict.2 01 This factor was of prime concern
to the Subafilms court.202 The court maintained that it was vital as a
matter of public policy to respect the legal sovereignty of other nations
since the United States had recently joined the Berne Convention.203
195 Id. at 73. Cf Jonathan Turley, "Wien in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Pre-
sumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 598, 601 (1990) (stating that "courts have
developed fundamentally different tests for determining extraterritorial jurisdiction and that,
contrary to common belief, there is no consistent canon of construction for interpreting
ambiguous statutes").
196 For a discussion of the differential application of legislation to United States versus
foreign nationals, see supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
197 See EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 274 (1991) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
198 See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 274 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
199 Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W 3382 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1994) (No. 94-546); see also infra note 203 and
accompanying text discussing the national treatment principle under the Berne Convention.
200 See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 274 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
201 Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
202 See supra note 48.
203 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1097-98. The Berne Convention was originally established and
adopted by ten countries in 1886. Hatch, supra note 2, at 174. A primary purpose of the
Convention was the protection of copyrighted materials in international markets through the
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Even assuming that the facts of Subafilms could fit into the Massey ex-
ceptions, the international comity issue was sufficient to justify defer-
ence to the legislature.20 4 This reason for not extending legislation
extraterritorially is supported even by Justice Marshall.20 5 Accordingly,
the Subafilms court reached the correct decision in light of the substan-
tial policy considerations involved in the case.
V. Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit may have incorrectly held that domestic autho-
rizations of wholly foreign copyright infringements do not state a cause
of action under the Copyright Act. The court's finding that the words
"to authorize" establish a third-party action dependent on a primary
infringement is supported by substantial case law.20 6 Similarly, the
court's refusal to extend the scope of the Act extraterritorially is in line
with both precedent and public policy grounds 0 7 Nevertheless, the
court's reasoning that extraterritorial primary infringements cannot
serve as the basis for contributory authorizations in the United States
confuses the issue of subject matter jurisdiction with the issue of third-
party liability. What should be important is that the primary act falls
under section 106, not whether U.S. copyright law applies to the pri-
mary act jurisdictionally for enforcement purposes. As such, the
court's argument is unconvincing.
Despite the questionable analysis with respect to case law, the
Subafilms case will probably have a noticeable impact on future copy-
right decisions by courts and individuals alike. The decision brings
together two strands of case law interpreting the scope of section 106
and establishes a bright-line rule against actions for domestic authori-
promulgation of copyright laws and the elimination of copyright practices that favored do-
mestic over foreign works. Id. The fundamental tenet of the Convention is the national
treatment principle, under which copyright owners are provided the same protection in
other countries as those countries grant their own citizens. See, e.g., Deborah Ross, Com-
ment, The United States Joins the Berne Convention: New Obligations for Authors' Moral Rights?, 68
N.C. L. REv. 363, 365 (1990).
The United States accession produced several significant consequences:
(1) As of March 1, 1989, U.S. Copyrights will automatically be protected in
over seventy-nine of the Berne Union nations;
(2) Berne Union countries will provide U.S. copyright holders the agreed min-
imum level of protection;
(3) Berne members will treat U.S. nationals like their own nationals for copy-
right purposes;
(4) More effective combat of piracy of U.S. works abroad; and
(5) As of March 1, 1989, foreign nationals whose works were first published in
another Union country are afforded automatic protection in the United States.
Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Circular No. 93, Highlights of U.S. Adherence to the Berne
Convention (Aug. 1989), reprinted inJamesJ. Merriman, Note, Battling Motion Picture Pirates in
Turbid International Waters, 23 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 623, 628 (1991).
204 Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1096-97.
205 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 266 (1991) (Marshall,J.,
dissenting).
206 See supra part III.A.
207 See supra part IV.A-B.
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zations of foreign infringements. 20 8 This will at least put copyright
owners on notice that their intellectual property is vulnerable, even if
it will not protect them from illegal authorizations. The decision also
bolsters the presumption of territoriality in cases where international
policy is likely to be affected.209
A more workable solution to Subafilms would have been to allow
direct actions against individuals within the United States who illegally
authorize foreign infringements listed in section 106. This would pre-
serve authorization as a traditional third-party theory of liability. How-
ever, it also would give courts the statutory authority to hold illegal
authorizers liable for their actions without setting up artificial barriers
to their prosecution, such as the site of the actual infringement. Com-
bined with the presumption against extraterritorial application of the
Copyright Act, this reading would more adequately protect intellectual
property in the increasingly interconnected global market. The law
would serve as a disincentive for individuals to authorize foreign in-
fringements while engendering good relations with other nations for
the protection of intellectual property.
MICHAEL W. BALLANCE
208 The court's enunciation of this rule seems secure for the present time. The U.S.
Supreme Court denied without comment Appellees' writ for certiorari. Subafilms, Ltd. v.
United Artists Corp., 63 U.S.L.W. 3382 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1994) (No. 94-546).
209 The Subafilm court's holding on the issue of extraterritorial application of U.S. law
has been cited already by at least two courts as supporting the presumption of territoriality.
See Gushi Bros. Co. v. Bank of Guam, 28 F.3d 1535, 1538 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that antity-
ing provision of Bank Holding Company Act was not applicable to a transaction taking place
wholly in the Republic of the Marshall Islands); In re Maxwell Communication Corp. v. Bar-
clays Bank, 170 B.R. 800, 809 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the British rather than the
American preference avoidance statute applied to a British corporation's preferential trans-
fers to British and French banks).
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